African elephant poaching rates correlate with local poverty, national corruption and global ivory price by Hauenstein, Severin et al.
ARTICLE
African elephant poaching rates correlate with local
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Poaching is contributing to rapid declines in elephant populations across Africa. Following
high-proﬁle changes in the political environment, the overall number of illegally killed ele-
phants in Africa seems to be falling, but to evaluate potential conservation interventions we
must understand the processes driving poaching rates at local and global scales. Here we
show that annual poaching rates in 53 sites strongly correlate with proxies of ivory demand in
the main Chinese markets, whereas between-country and between-site variation is strongly
associated with indicators of corruption and poverty. Our analysis reveals a recent decline in
annual poaching mortality rate from an estimated peak of over 10% in 2011 to <4% in 2017.
Based on these ﬁndings, we suggest that continued investment in law enforcement could
further reduce poaching, but is unlikely to succeed without action that simultaneously
reduces ivory demand and tackles corruption and poverty.
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Recent high-level political summits
1 and a number of well-
publicised ivory destruction events in China2 and the USA3
have pushed elephant poaching high up the international
agenda. The evidence for an increase in African elephant (Lox-
odonta africana) poaching since the early 2000s is compelling:
seizures of illegal ivory shipments have been rising4, core popu-
lations both inside and outside protected areas5 falling by 30% in
seven years6 and the number of dead elephants found poached
have increased7. Conservation efforts have focussed on demand
reduction (China's recent ban on ivory trade is considered a
major success8,9) and increased control of supply (e.g. Tanzania's
controversial Operation Tokomeza10 and the call to scale up
elephant anti-poaching funds11). Figures presented at Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) meetings since 2011 suggest poaching rates may be
responding, but the effectiveness of different interventions is
unclear and empirical data are scarce12.
Elephants are the very deﬁnition of charismatic megafauna, but
they are also important engineers of African savannah and forest
ecosystems13 and play a vital role in attracting ecotourism14, so
their conservation is a real concern. While it seems clear that
elephant poaching is a pan-African problem6,7, the effect of
poaching is not uniform; some populations are stable or
increasing15 (e.g. South Africa’s Kruger National Park) and ele-
phant poaching remains virtually unknown in several African
protected areas (e.g. Etosha in Namibia). Such spatial and tem-
poral variation allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of current
conservation efforts and identify solutions to the poaching
problem.
Current discussion of how to reduce poaching focuses on two
areas: reducing demand16,17, and reducing supply18. In recent
years, increased demand for ivory in East Asia and particularly
China is widely perceived to be the ultimate driver of increased
poaching in Africa, primarily based on analysis of the destina-
tions of intercepted ivory shipments4, the growth in per capita
income19 and the traditional market for ivory in China20. Com-
bined with an increasingly large economic involvement of China
in Africa, shortening the links between resource and market,
Chinese demand has been blamed for rising ivory prices and
fuelling the rapid increase in illegal activity21. The illegal trade in
ivory, however, is complicated: certainly Chinese demand is
important, but recently more large seizures of raw ivory were
made in Thailand, with transit centres for shipping to other East
Asian states such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam4.
Reducing demand has been seen as a crucial step in stemming
poaching in Africa18, yet the economics of illegal trade make this
complicated22: trade bans and associated ivory seizures may even
increase poaching incentives by causing price rises in elephant
ivory23.
Supply-side anti-poaching policies focus on increased effec-
tiveness of law enforcement: more patrols by better resourced
rangers24. In practice, traditional law enforcement activities can
reduce illegal activities24,25. Unfortunately, as commodity prices
rise, law enforcement becomes inadequate with numerous
examples of thriving illegal markets persisting for natural (e.g.
rhino horn) and other (e.g. narcotics, arms, etc.) products despite
high investment in law enforcement26. Moreover, endemic cor-
ruption and limited capacity in many source countries means
that, even if arrests are made in the ﬁeld, prosecutions may fail or
enforcement focuses only on the lowest tier of individuals
involved in the trade: effective law enforcement may only be
possible if corruption levels are low and enforcement capacity
high25,27. Additional supply-focused solutions draw on the sug-
gestion that poaching rates may be highest in the poorest regions,
where the ﬁnancial temptations of illegal activities are relatively
greater28. This has generated interest in community-based
conservation programmes that seek to tie conservation
improvements directly to poverty alleviation29 and there is evi-
dence this can reduce local poaching rates30.
Although it is plausible that elephant poaching cannot be
halted without interventions aimed at multiple stages of the ivory
trade, it is likely that elephant poaching responds more strongly
to certain interventions than others. Here, we have two aims: (a)
to test whether local conditions in different sites and in different
years can explain variation in poaching rates between and within
elephant populations; and (b) to identify the processes to which
poaching rates are most sensitive, thereby identifying priority
targets for conservation. Based on hierarchical regression models,
correlating annual carcass-encounter data from 53 African
Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) sites (see
Fig. 1) between 2002 and 2017 to local, regional and global socio-
economic covariates, we explore the possible contribution of
relevant drivers to reducing poaching.
Results and discussion
Correlates of elephant poaching. Both demand and supply could
affect ivory poaching rates, so we identiﬁed large-scale ivory
seizures and mammoth ivory prices in the main Chinese markets
as likely proxies for annual variation in ivory demand and used
site- and country-level variables such as infant mortality rate
(IMR), poverty density (both indices for poverty), corruption
perception index (CPI), site area and law enforcement adequacy
as proxies for supply-limiting processes (Supplementary Table 1).
Using these data we ﬁtted a Bayesian lasso-regulated hierarchical
regression model to estimate the annual proportion of all
encountered elephant carcasses that were identiﬁed as illegally
killed (PIKE; see Eq. 1) between 2002 and 2017 in all monitoring
sites. For independent validation31, we ﬁtted the model to
training data (2002–13), and compared estimated PIKE for
2014–17 to the respective observed PIKE ( eR2 ¼ 0:48, Fig. 2b). We
found that annual effects for 2014–17 (including a predicted
change in direction of poaching rate) were very similar for the
model using training data, compared to a model ﬁtted to all data
(Fig. 2a), providing independent support for our model. We
estimated observed annual continental poaching rates (black
crosses in Fig. 2a) as the sum of all observed carcasses across sites,
derived annual continental PIKE values and computed annual
continental poaching rates (see Eq. 7). These raw results may be
biased downwards, because sites that ﬁnd more carcasses dom-
inate the continentally aggregated PIKE observations, but they
may ﬁnd more carcasses because they are better resourced and
hence tend to have lower poaching rates than sites with fewer
observations.
In the regularised model, all covariates, except for site area
showed non-zero correlations with PIKE, but only a subset
showed credibility intervals (CIs) that excluded zero (Supple-
mentary Table 2). Speciﬁcally, we found a strong positive
association between ivory price and annual variation in poaching
rates (Fig. 3h), while site level variation was positively correlated
with poverty density (number of people per km2 earning less than
US$ 1.25 per day) and negatively correlated with estimated law
enforcement adequacy (Fig. 3d, f). We also found strong evidence
that PIKE decreases with falling national corruption (Fig. 3c).
While we found strong correlates of PIKE, it is important to note
that substantial residual variance remains unexplained (see Fig. 3).
We found no evidence that alternative temporal lags in ivory
price or seizures changed our results (Supplementary Tables 6–
13): an effect of seizure rate at different lags was never supported
in our models. Ivory prices with one year lag were correlated with
PIKE but with smaller regression coefﬁcients than the zero-lag
models, while lags of two years showed no inﬂuence on PIKE
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Fig. 1 Annual poaching trend by site. Map of MIKE sites62 in Africa76, showing estimated elephant population sizes15 (from <10 in Niokolo-Koba National
Park, NKK, to 45,254 in Selous-Mikumi Game Reserve and National Park, SEL) proportional to the size of the respective pie chart, estimated median
proportion of illegally killed elephants (illegal= solid pie piece, legal= transparent colours), annual trend in estimated PIKE (green= decline [¼^ less
poaching], grey= no decline) between 2012 and 2017 (for site names see Supplementary Results), and the known and possible range of African savannah
elephants51
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Fig. 2 Estimated annual poaching intensity—observed and estimated. a Annual estimates of per capita poaching rate across 53 MIKE monitoring sites.
Displayed estimates are annual median poaching rates across all sites in each year, derived from 3000 MCMC samples. Grey lines display estimates from
the model ﬁtted to all data, with solid black line showing median estimates and dashed lines outlining 90% CI. Blue boxes represent estimates from the
model (same structure) ﬁtted to training data (2002–13) only, red colour highlights estimates for test data (2014–17). Boxplot centre lines represent
median estimates, box bounds ﬁrst and third quartiles, and whiskers 90% CIs. Crosses represent overall observed poaching rate across all sites and will be
biased towards sites where more carcasses are found. b Median PIKE estimates for the testing period (2014–17) from 3000 MCMC samples of the model
ﬁtted to training data (2002–13) only, compared against the respective observed PIKE values. Darker grey indicates larger sample size. The black line and
error envelope represent the mean estimates and the 95% conﬁdence interval from a weighted regression ﬁtted to these data, the dashed line represents
identity. eR2 of weighted correlation is 0.48 (90% CI: 0.39–0.54)
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(Supplementary Tables 6–13). This suggests that temporal
lags between market prices and poaching rates are themselves
short, supporting the evidence that the ivory trade is run by
highly organised criminal networks with good knowledge of
markets32.
Annual poaching rates and trends. Our estimates of the annual
PIKE of the ﬁrst part of the time series are broadly consistent with
estimates from earlier analyses7,12. In later parts, we found a peak
in 2011 and slowly decreasing PIKE levels thereafter: the median
annual poaching rate in MIKE sites in 2011 was 10.4% (90% CI:
8.8%–12.5%), but fell to 3.7% (90% CI: 3.2%–4.5%) in 2017 (see
Fig. 2a). Elephant population growth rates can be 5% per
year33,34, suggesting current poaching rates could be sustainable if
poaching mortality entirely compensated for natural mortality.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical data available to identify
the proportion of poaching mortality that may be additive, but
because the deaths of larger, older elephants (particularly females)
can reduce survival and birth rates among other individuals of the
herd35,36, poaching mortality is likely to be at least partially
additive. Consequently, the overall pattern of poaching offers no
room for complacency if demand for ivory remains high. Com-
parison with the case of the Black Rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis)
offer a cautionary example: a species which had a population of
around 100,000 in 1960, yet poaching caused a decline of 97.5%
by 1995, and even the most highly protected populations have
suffered from severe poaching37.
Separating poaching rates by region revealed similar temporal
patterns among all regions, but large differences in estimated
poaching rate (Fig. 4). MIKE sites in western and central Africa
recorded much higher overall rates of poaching than eastern and
southern populations, conﬁrming a growing literature38,39.
Temporal differences by region were small, reﬂecting mainly
lower peaks in southern Africa and slight differences in timing of
peaks between regions. This likely reﬂects in part constraints
imposed by the model (PIKE must respond similarly to changes
in ivory price), but because our model incorporates site- and
country-level covariates and random effects, such consistent
between-region patterns suggests all regions do show broadly
parallel changes. Although savannah elephant populations are
largest in eastern and southern Africa, high poaching rates in
western and central Africa are a particular concern because these
regions are the only homes of already heavily depleted forest
elephant populations39.
Identifying conservation targets. To examine the efﬁcacy of
feasible intervention targets, we estimated the change in median
poaching rate if each variable in turn was set to the most opti-
mistic recorded level for that variable in the actual data (i.e. we
explored for example the effect of returning to 2002’s ivory prices
of US$ 22 kg−1, the consequence of all countries achieving
Botswanas 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score, and
the adequacy of law enforcement estimated for Namibia’s Etosha
National Park, etc.). As such, our test of possible effectiveness
combines information on how much site level covariates could be
improved and the sensitivity of poaching rates to each covariate.
The imposed changes represent plausible conservation targets as
at least one country, site or year has managed to achieve this
value, but predictions should be treated cautiously as they are
derived from correlative models. Overall poaching levels seemed
sensitive to changes in indices of poverty, but were more strongly
linked to corruption and changes in ivory price, whilst seizures
and site area showed minimal impacts (Fig. 5). Of course, at
different sites and in different countries, different strategies are
likely to be effective although we found that virtually all sites
would proﬁt the most from country-wide reductions in corrup-
tion (see Supplementary Results for site- and country-level evi-
dence). At a regional level we estimated ranked efﬁcacy of
different intervention targets to be nearly identical to the overall
pattern, the only difference being a slight increase in relative
effectiveness of improved law enforcement in western Africa
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Fig. 3 Conditional relationships between key covariates and the estimated
proportion of illegally killed elephants (PIKE). Site by year covariates (steel
blue) a infant mortality rate and b annual precipitation, the country by year
covariate (light blue) c corruption perception, the site level covariates (dark
grey), d poverty density, e site area, and f law enforcement adequacy, and
the annual (brick red) g large-scale ivory seizures, and h ivory price. Error
envelopes represent 90% credibility intervals from 3000 MCMC samples,
horizontal dashed lines illustrate the estimated intercept median. All effects
plots are overlaid with response-scale partial residuals (points for site and
country by year covariates and boxes for site and annual covariates).
Boxplot centre lines represent median estimates, box bounds ﬁrst and third
quartiles, and whiskers 90% CIs. All plots are scaled the same to make
effect sizes directly comparable
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compared to other regions (cf. Supplementary Results, pages 5,
20, 31 and 47).
It is striking that poverty and corruption-related covariates
correlate with local and country-wide levels of poaching more
strongly than estimates of law enforcement adequacy (cf.
Fig. 3a–f). This is possibly due to difﬁculty in estimating law
enforcement adequacy; however, all assessors were trained and we
consider it likely that targeting poverty and corruption really are
more effective options. Tackling corruption is difﬁcult, but
conservation has started working in this area40. Tackling poverty
is also notoriously difﬁcult, but there has been a recent increase in
attempts to link conservation to poverty alleviation41. It is
important to note that the association we ﬁnd with poverty is not
speciﬁc to community-based natural resource management
programmes: we ﬁnd a generally lower poaching rate in areas
where multiple indicators of poverty are lower and we have not
looked speciﬁcally at whether conservation at a site has signiﬁcant
poverty alleviation goals. If well implemented, community-based
conservation efforts that combine wildlife conservation with
material beneﬁts to community members may improve both
conservation status and reduce poverty42,43. Notable successes for
elephant conservation include the example of Namibian
conservancies where elephant poaching has been substantially
reduced44, though impacts on poverty are mixed41,45, but these
good examples should be read within a context of highly variable
impacts on poaching in community-based natural resource
management systems46. Our results support both community-
based conservation projects where they provide genuine poverty-
alleviation and increased involvement by conservation in more
general poverty reduction schemes. However, as both corruption
and poverty are recalcitrant problems, focusing conservation
activity purely on reducing supply is unwise.
In conclusion, we conﬁrm that elephant poaching rates in
Africa have started to decline after the peak in 2011, reaching
plausible natural birth rates again in 2016/2017. As natural
mortality is likely not entirely compensatory to poaching deaths,
Africa’s elephant populations remain threatened without con-
tinued reductions in poaching. Interventions need to focus both
on reducing demand and supply of ivory: as ivory prices rise,
demand seems to change relatively little47, but our results suggest
supply changes strongly. Any reduction in demand may therefore
markedly reduce elephant poaching rates. While the observed
changes in demand are consistent with the signals sent by Chinas
elephant ivory trade ban and demand reduction campaigns by
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Fig. 4 Region-speciﬁc annual estimates of per capita poaching rates. Displayed estimates are annual median poaching rates across the sites and years
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respective region and will be biased towards sites where more carcasses are found. N^ represents the sum of the latest population size estimates over all
sites within the respective region15
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NGOs9,17, falling demand might also be a result of a Chinese
economic slowdown48. Finally, we suggest that improving law
enforcement using conventional methods in many areas might
reduce elephant poaching, but reductions in poverty and
corruption in communities neighbouring protected areas may
have a greater effect and obvious additional beneﬁts.
Methods
Elephant carcass encounter data. African elephant carcass data were collected as
part of the Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) programme, which
was instituted by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES) in 2002 and since then has worked with wildlife authorities across Africa
to implement a ranger-based monitoring programme. The programme collates
annual carcass counts from 53 sites (mostly protected areas, but often extending
into neighbouring unprotected zones) in 29 countries across sub-saharan Africa.
Full details of the monitoring methods are described elsewhere12, but, in essence,
rangers on regular patrols record the location of any elephant carcass encountered
and identify whether death was the result of natural mortality, management or
illegal killing (almost always poaching for ivory, but very occasionally the result of
retaliation in human-elephant conﬂict). Between 2002 and 2017, the programme
has recorded 18,007 carcasses in Africa, of which 8860 were identiﬁed as illegal
killings, providing 607 observations from 53 sites in 16 years (includes all records
received by February 2018). Several sites did not report carcasses every year, or
joined the programme later than 2002.
It should be noted that these carcass encounter data, collated by the MIKE
programme, show a few potential limitations12: (a) variation in background
mortality (i.e. carcasses resulting from natural mortality or management) is
unknown, but inﬂuences PIKE as it is assumed to be constant across years and
sites. Background mortality (here natural mortality) is increased during droughts
and periods of low rainfall49,50, so we aimed to account for variable natural
mortality by estimating the effect of site-speciﬁc annual precipitation on PIKE and
setting this effect to zero for the predictions of the model. (b) Calculating PIKE
across sites and years is based on the assumption that detection probabilities are the
same for all carcasses, resulting from illegal activities, management or natural
reasons. This might be an unlikely assumption, as the data are collected by anti-
poaching patrols with the objective to deter illegal activities. It seems plausible to
assume, however, that this bias is rather constant across space and time leading to
an accurate estimation of trends and association with covariates. (c) Based on data
from 53 sites across Africa, the prediction of poaching rates might not cover the full
uncertainty of continental estimates, yet the surveyed area covers 25% of the area
where African savannah elephants are extant residents51 and about 50% of Africa’s
savannah elephant population6,15.
Covariates. The choice of covariates (Supplementary Table 1), considered as
potential drivers of poaching intensity, was guided by previous studies7,12 and
expert knowledge52. We included covariates that we considered to relate to demand
or supply of elephant ivory, including factors that vary at temporal and spatial
levels and two separate indicators of poverty: infant mortality rate and poverty
density. Poverty is a complex, multidimensional problem that cannot easily be
measured in a single variable53, but the negative impact of poverty on illegal
wildlife activities has been highlighted before18 so it is important to consider
multiple aspects of poverty. Not all covariates were available at the highest site-by-
year resolution. Below, we present them in the following order: site-by-year,
country-by-year, site-level, annual. Before the analysis, all covariates were centred
and standardised to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. We also tested
for collinearity among predictors. All combinations showed Spearman’s ρ2 esti-
mates <0.5, which we considered a non-problematic correlation (see Supplemen-
tary Fig. 1).
Infant mortality rate: The infant mortality rate (IMR) measures the number of
deaths of children under one year of age per 1000 live births and is a crude
indicator of development and socio-economic status levels in a community54. Note
that IMR is included entirely as a proxy for one axis of poverty55: if IMR is strongly
predictive of elephant poaching rates we would not interpret this as suggesting that
healthcare interventions alone would be expected to impact poaching rates.
IMR estimates were available at site level for the year 2000, produced by the
Centre for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN56). Annual
IMR estimates by country were made available by the United Nations (UN) inter-
agency group for child mortality estimation57. As both spatial and temporal
variability are high, we combined the two datasets to obtain IMR estimates for
every site in every year. In reality, improvement rates in rural and urban areas may
differ, but national changes likely reﬂect greater improvements in the rural areas
where elephant populations are most common and IMR is higher, rather than
smaller changes from urbanisation58.
It is important to note that spatial differences in average IMR might represent
differences between sites in poverty better than annual IMR measures. Annual IMR
declines over time as successful medical and public health measures have improved
healthcare much faster than other factors associated with poverty have improved,
potentially weakening the value of annual IMR as a proxy for overall poverty. We
therefore tested the correlation of site-level IMR56 with PIKE in a separate model,
in which we neglected the temporal changes in IMR entirely. The results of this
supplementary analysis supports the assumption that spatial variation in IMR is a
better indicator of poverty than temporal variation (see Supplementary Table 5).
Precipitation: Annual precipitation per site was derived from the Climate
Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS59). In the
analysis, we took the natural logarithm of this variable because of its left skewed
distribution. This climate variable was included to allow for changes in natural
elephant mortality. Variation might arise from two processes. Sites with higher
precipitation may identify denser habitats, where ﬁnding carcasses due to natural
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Fig. 5 Sensitivity of estimated poaching rates to different simulated conservation targets. Each box represents 3000 median MCMC samples from model
predictions between 2006 and 2017, where each covariate in turn is set to the best value at any site, country or year, while the other covariates were set to
their observed values. The white box displays poaching rate median estimates without simulated intervention. Boxplot centre lines represent median
estimates, box bounds ﬁrst and third quartiles, and whiskers 90% CIs. For predictions, precipitation was set to the average value across sites and years to
reduce variation in natural mortality rates across sites and years. The colour scheme is the same as in Fig. 3
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mortality is more difﬁcult, and hence PIKE may be higher due to underestimated
natural mortality. Secondly, lower precipitation (within or among sites) may
increase natural mortality49,50 and thus lead to underestimated poaching rates
because of lower PIKE values.
Corruption perceptions index: Corruption perceptions index (CPI) was derived
by Transparency International60 for every country in every year. It represents the
perceived level of public sector corruption of a country according to experts and
businesspeople. The index uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is ‘highly corrupt’ and
100 is ‘very clean’. We included CPI as a proxy for public sector and political
corruption, which has been shown to affect the presence of illegal wildlife
activities27.
Poverty density: Poverty density deﬁnes the number of people per km2 earning
less than US$ 1.25 per day. It represents a measure of relative poverty and thus
another proxy of the multidimensional poverty problem. These site level data were
provided for the year 2005 by HarvestChoice61.
Site area: Surface area of MIKE sites62 in km2. In the analysis, we took the
natural logarithm of this variable because of its left skewed distribution. The
expected effect of the site area on poaching intensity is somewhat ambivalent. On
the one hand, larger protected areas might exhibit less of the negative edge effect,
on the other hand, smaller ecosystems might be easier to patrol.
Law enforcement adequacy: Estimates of the adequacy of law enforcement
provision. For each site, MIKE specialists return a form after receiving training
from (https://cites.org/eng/prog/mike/tools_training_materials/leca) the MIKE
programme team, estimating the adequacy of law enforcement provision. We
expected ecosystems with higher law enforcement adequacy to show lower PIKE
values.
Large-scale ivory seizures: Annual weight of large scale ivory seizures
(≥500 kg)63,64. In cases, where worked ivory was part of the consignment, the
values were converted to raw ivory equivalent, factoring in a 30% loss during
processing.
Ivory price: Annual mammoth ivory prices in the main Chinese markets
(China, Hong Kong and Macao) were derived from the UN Comtrade database65.
This covariate was included as a proxy for demand for elephant ivory, as we assume
that mammoth ivory prices are correlated with black market elephant ivory prices
(for which data do not exist). Yet, it is worth noting that price for ivory is likely not
only affected by market demand, but also more general conditions of the economy.
To correct the obtained trade values for varying inﬂation rates, we used World
Bank consumer price indices66. The corrected trade values were averaged by taking
the market speciﬁc net weight into account. Note that Macao only reported
mammoth ivory prices for the years 2006–09 and 2014.
Ivory price and impacts of seizures on supply and demand may inﬂuence
poaching rates over a variety of time-scales. While poachers in Africa may be aware
of international trends, it is possible information about markets ﬂows slowly to the
ﬁeld. Consequently, we repeated all our analyses with lags of up to two years in
these two variables, as is common within econometric analyses67. In the main
results we present the zero-lag model.
Statistical analysis. Inferring elephant poaching intensity from carcass encounter
data is difﬁcult when, as here, sampling effort is unknown. Estimating the pro-
portion of illegally killed elephants (PIKE), a relative measure, somewhat reduces
this issue, assuming sampling effort is invariant for carcasses of natural and illegal
causes in a particular year and site.
To estimate PIKE for each observation i, we assumed the number of carcasses
identiﬁed as illegal killings (nillegal) to be a binomial random variable given the total
number of elephant carcasses (ntotal) and probability p, such that
nillegal;i  Binomialðpi; ntotal;iÞ; ð1Þ
where probability pi (=estimated PIKE) is a function of a set of a priori chosen
environmental and socio-economic covariates and year-, country- and site-level
normally distributed ðN Þ random intercepts with level-speciﬁc means (μ) and
standard deviations (σ), transformed using the canonical logit link:
logit pið Þ ¼ β0 þ β1 ln Precipi
 þ β2IMRi þ β3 CPIcountry½i
þN μsite½i; σsite½i
 
þN μyear½i; σyear½i
 
þN 0; σcountry½i
 
:
ð2Þ
To account for the spatial and temporal structure of the data, the hierarchical
level means for site (μsite) and year (μyear) were modelled in detail such that
μsite;s ¼ β4PovDenss þ β5 LawEnf s þ β6 ln Areað Þs; ð3Þ
μyear;y ¼ β7 Seizuresy þ β8 IvoryPricey : ð4Þ
βn represent the regression coefﬁcients, CPI is the annual country-level
corruption perceptions index, PovDens (poverty density), Area (site area) and
LawEnf (law enforcement adequacy) are site-level covariates, Seizures (large scale
ivory seizures) and IvoryPrice (ivory price) are annual-level covariates, and Precip
(precipitation) and IMR (infant mortality rate) are annual site-level covariates.
The model was ﬁtted via Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling using
the software JAGS68, accessed through the R69 package R2jags70. The parameter
posterior estimates were derived in three independent chains, each of 100,000
iterations, a burn-in phase of 50,000 iterations and thinned to every 50th sample.
Based on estimated R^71 and effective sample sizes the applied MCMC algorithm
fully converged (see Supplementary Table 2).
With the objective to build an interpretable model with high predictive capacity
of PIKE, we regularised the model using the Bayesian lasso72 instead of applying
subset selection. By imposing a penalty proportional to the absolute values of the
regression coefﬁcients (L1-norm penalty), the lasso73 automates variable selection
using continuous shrinkage and leads to a sparse model representation. In Bayesian
inference, we achieve this using Laplace priors for the regression parameters βn,
such that
βn  Laplaceðμ ¼ 0; b ¼ λ1Þ; ð5Þ
where the regularisation parameter, λ, represents the inverse of the scale parameter
in the Laplace distribution (or the rate in an exponential distribution), resulting in
stronger shrinkage with increasing λ. We allowed the model to estimate λ from the
data by setting it as a hyperparameter. For its implicit estimation, we imposed a
diffuse gamma hyperprior on λ2 to maintain conjugacy:
λ2  δ
r
Γ rð Þ λ
2 r1eδλ2 ; ð6Þ
with shape r = 1 and rate δ = 1, which resulted in a median posterior estimate of
λ = 1.64 (90% CI: 1.00–2.42). We also used gamma priors with r = 1 and δ = 1 on
the standard deviations of the year-, country- and site-level random effects. We
tested the sensitivity of the choice of prior distributions on λ, σsite, σyear and σcountry.
The regression coefﬁcients showed little difference when imposing uniform instead
of gamma prior distributions (compare Supplementary Tables 2 and 3).
For an assessment of the models predictive capacity accounting for potential
temporal dependencies31, we ﬁrst sliced the data into temporal blocks of training
and test sets. Training data comprises all records in the period 2002 to 2013
(ntraining = 447, i.e. ~75%). Test data are all observations between 2014 and 2017
(ntest = 160, i.e. ~25%). To validate the model, we estimated PIKE for the period
2014–17 from 3000 MCMC draws of the model ﬁtted to the training data. These
estimates were compared against the respective PIKE observations in the test set
(Fig. 2b). As a measure of predictive power we calculated R2 weighted by ntotal
Estimating annual poaching rates. While the proportion of illegally killed ele-
phants (PIKE) overcomes the problem of unknown sampling effort, the rate of
illegal killing (i.e. the proportion of illegally killed elephants of the total population)
is more intuitive. Burnham52 proposed a simple conversion from PIKE to poaching
rate (mp), given an pre-deﬁned natural mortality rate (mn):
mp ¼
PIKEmn
1 PIKE ð7Þ
As such, the derived poaching rate retains a perfect 1:1 relationship with PIKE.
Based on estimates collated by Wittemyer et al.7, we assumed a constant natural
mortality of 3% (mn = 0.03), but compared the results to estimates with 2% (mn =
0.02) and 4% (mn = 0.04) natural mortality (see Supplementary Fig. 3). It is worth
noting that as PIKE tends to 1, the estimated poaching rate increases exponentially,
which might lead to implausibly high poaching rates. Therefore, when estimating
continental annual poaching rates, we depicted the median across site-speciﬁc
annual poaching rates. Site-speciﬁc assessment (see Supplementary Results) was
based on the estimated PIKE, because in some sites PIKE values were estimated
close to 1. Note we did not impose a cap on estimated PIKE, as poaching rates even
in large elephant populations can be extremely high74.
To predict the annual continental poaching rate (grey lines in Fig. 2a), we drew
3000 samples from the posterior distribution to estimate PIKE for all surveyed sites
and years, translated these into site-by-year poaching rates and took the annual
median value. For the observed annual continental poaching rate (black crosses in
Fig. 2a), we ﬁrst summed up all observed carcasses across sites, derived annual
continental PIKE values and turned them into annual continental poaching rates.
Note that the latter might be biased downwards, because sites that report more
carcasses (e.g. due to better resourced ranger patrols), and thus dominate the
continentally aggregated PIKE observations, tend to have lower poaching rates
than sites with fewer observations.
Identifying conservation targets. To identify potential conservation targets, we
estimated the sensitivity of the estimated poaching rate to improvements in the
socio-economic factors considered. We used 3000 MCMC samples from the
ﬁtted model to predict continental annual poaching rates (or region- and site-
speciﬁc PIKE; see Supplementary Results) with the predictor values con-
secutively set to the best (i.e. most elephant friendly) observed value within all
53 sites and 15 years. These were: IMR= 17.73 deaths/1000 infants (Tarangire
and Manyara National Parks, Tanzania 2016); CPI= 65 (Botswana 2012);
poverty density= 4.85 people km−2 at < US$ 1.25 per day (Lopé National Park,
Gabon); site area= 81,046 km2 (Selous and Mikumi National Parks, Tanzania);
law enforcement adequacy= 0.83 (Etosha National Park, Namibia); large-scale
ivory seizures= 790 kg (2002); mammoth ivory price=US$ 23.72 kg−1 (2002).
Thus, the differences among sites and countries (see Supplementary Results) are
simply a consequence of the current situation in a site or country relative to the
best situation in any site or country between 2002 and 2017, and do not
represent different effect sizes among sites and countries.
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Spatial and temporal residual autocorrelation. We checked for spatial and
temporal residual autocorrelation using the Sncf function in the ncf R package75,
which allows for a spatio-temporally structured model to be analysed. Residuals
were calculated as the difference of estimated and observed PIKE. We did not
consider any of this further as the residuals showed neither consistent spatial nor
temporal autocorrelation (Supplementary Fig. 2).
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
Data and Supplementary Results are available in a ﬁgshare data repository at https://doi.
org/10.6084/m9.ﬁgshare.7713245.
Code availability
The analysis of the model and all data manipulations were built in R v. 3.369. The model
was ﬁtted in JAGS68, accessed through the R package R2jags70. R code to reproduce the
analysis is available in a ﬁgshare data repository at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.
ﬁgshare.7713245.
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